From all this it follows what the general character of the problem of the development of a body of scientific knowledge is, in so far as it depends on elements internal to science itself. ↗
It is that of increasing knowledge of empirical fact, intimately combined with changing interpretations of this body of fact - hence changing general statements about it - and, not least, a changing a structure of the theoretical system. ↗
Now obviously the propositions of the system have reference to matters of empirical fact; if they did not, they could have no claim to be called scientific. ↗
Special emphasis should be laid on this intimate interrelation of general statements about empirical fact with the logical elements and structure of theoretical systems. ↗
Thus, in general, in the first instance, the direction of interest in empirical fact will be canalised by the logical structure of the theoretical system. ↗
If it's a good LP, you'll get that tingle that makes you put it on again no matter what your initial reaction was. On the other hand, if you don't get that tingle, you'd better take it straight down to the record exchange. ↗